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Abstract 
[...]iron has to have the feature of rigidity for it to serve as the subject of a 
saw,"" and the human tissues must have the features that they have, if they 
are to be the subject of a human form. [...]the matter of a saw cannot be too 
soft, but, at least for certain varieties of sawing, it cannot be too hard either.  
I  
Two basic questions of physics are: what is the world made of, 
and why do these constituents do the things they do? These two 
questions are closely related. If certain kinds of things are the ultimate 
constituents of the world, it can only be because their characteristics 
explain what we observe to be the case. Further, if it were possible to 
grasp laws or necessary truths that explain absolutely everything, 
there would be no need to appeal to any kind that underlies those 
truths or laws; such a move would do no theoretical work. 
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Nonetheless, in the West most scientists have offered explanations 
that appeal to both what the basic things or stuff are, and the 
fundamental features they possess or laws they obey.  
This approach goes back to Aristotle, who insisted that 
explanation in physics requires identifying both a material substrate 
and a formal basis for what is to be explained. He argued that this 
holds in regard to explaining both the existence of substances and the 
fact that they bear certain attributes. In order to explain both why a 
substance exists and why a substance does what it does, one must 
appeal to its essence, as expressed in a definition that includes both 
matter and form.1 An event or attribute (such as anger) is to be 
accounted for both by pointing to the persisting substrate (the blood 
around the heart) and the form it takes on (a kind of boiling that is the 
result of perceived anger).2  
Metaphysics 1 tells the story of how, in fits and starts and to 
varying degrees, earlier thinkers came to realize that explanation 
demands identifying all four causes, including both the material and 
formal causes. Aristotle's earliest philosophical predecessors, the 
Milesians, are credited with offering explanations on the basis of 
matter.3 Aristotle criticizes their accounts as radically incomplete on 
the grounds that matter alone cannot account for all things and their 
characteristics. For example, it cannot account for goodness or 
beauty.4  
While the Milesians are said to have identified certain kinds of 
stuff as basic, Aristotle takes other predecessors, the so-called 
Pythagoreans, to have done the same for number. Aristotle associates 
them with the Milesians, insofar as he understands them to give at 
least some numbers the status of matter. The explanatory strategy of 
explaining derivative kinds on the basis of the characteristics of the 
basic kinds is the same; their dispute with the Milesians concerns what 
basic characteristics are most explanatory.5 Aristotle is dismissive of 
the Pythagorean notion of numbers that are not quantities of 
substances: "[A] number, whatever it is, is always a number of certain 
things, either of fire or earth or of units."6 Aristotle dismisses the 
ontology of the Pythagoreans by indicating the confusion of positing as 
basic what must inhere in a substrate. Perhaps it is a similar reaction 
to the notion of a number ontology that has led some contemporary 
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scholars7 to deny that Philolaus (Aristotle's likely source for 
Pythagorean number ontology) could have possibly thought that all 
things are made of number.  
Aristotle takes the Milesian explanatory strategy to be one of 
accounting for things on the basis of their being made up of certain 
stuffs, which, if not identical with the perceived constituents of familiar 
objects, are at least conceivable along the same lines. Today there are 
few, if any, neo-Milesians. As Planck wrote: "the physical world has 
become progressively more and more abstract; purely formal 
mathematical operations play a growing part, while qualitative 
differences tend to be explained more and more by means of 
quantitative differences."8 Mathematical features are formal. 
Nonetheless, Planck himself did not follow the path of Aristotle's 
Pythagoreans. He felt compelled to posit a kind of substrate to physical 
reality, even though he cautioned that imagining that substrate as like 
the stuffs or particles familiar from sensation can be highly misleading.  
In contrast, the Pythagorean strategy has new adherents, and 
not only because, in this physics, "purely formal mathematical 
operations play a growing part." Within recent years, a number of 
philosophers and computer scientists have suggested a kind of return 
to an ontology not too different from that of the Pythagoreans as 
described by Aristotle. This view has been called "structural realism": 
"realism" because, on this account, science describes the world as it 
really is; "structural" because the realities identified are not kinds of 
stuff or objects, but structures.  
For this reason, it is time to again take up the Aristotelian 
objection, that such an ontology is incoherent since any explanation of 
physical reality must be implicitly committed to a material substrate. I 
do so in the present paper, first by reconsidering the evidence, in 
order to become clear on exactly what Aristotle's objection is, before 
then showing how contemporary structural realists posit an ontology 
much like that of Aristotle's "Pythagoreans." Both take the objects of 
knowledge to be structure, not what is structured. I discuss both how 
pancomputationalists such as Edward Fredkin approach the 
Pythagorean account insofar as on their account all reality can in 
principle be expressed as one (very big) number, made up of discrete 
units, and how even more moderate varieties of structural realism, like 
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that of Floridi, share with pancomputationalism the aspect of 
Pythagorean ontology that Aristotle finds so objectionable: positing 
structure or form with no substrate. I conclude by arguing that 
Aristotle himself is drawn to something close or identical to a structural 
realist ontology in book 7 of the Metaphysics. He himself comes to see 
that those aspects of the world that are real, and as such intelligible, 
are formal. He would agree with Saunders, who writes, "I believe that 
objects are structures; I see no reason to suppose that there are 
ultimate constituents of the world, which are not themselves to be 
understood in structural terms. So far as I am concerned, it is turtles 
all the way down."9 Such an account confirms the main lines of 
Pythagorean ontology.  
II  
Aristotle discusses several ontologies which posit mathematical 
entities as basic. Much of books 13 and 14 of the Metaphysics is 
devoted to what Aristotle takes to be the incoherence of the ontology 
of Plato and other members of the Academy who posited quantities as 
principles separate from the things of which they are principles.10 
Metaphysics 1.5 focuses on the distinctly mathematical character of 
the ontology of thinkers who are referred to as "the Pythagoreans." 
Aristotle writes:  
[T]he so-called Pythagoreans who were the first to put their 
hand to mathematics both advanced it and, having been 
brought up with it, thought that its principles are the principles 
of everything. Since among such principles, numbers are by 
nature primary, and they thought that they saw among them 
many "resemblances" (ὁμοιώματα), among beings and among 
events (οὖσι καὶ γιγνομένοις), for than one does in fire and air 
and water-for example, the attribute (πάθος) of number in this 
thing here is justice and in that, soul and intellect, and 
something else is good timing (καιρὁς) and, so to speak, this is 
how things are for each of the other things-and further, since 
they saw in numbers attributes and ratios of scales (τῶν 
ἁρμονιῶν) — since, then, other things seemed to have their 
entire nature modeled on numbers, and since, of all nature, 
numbers are primary, they took the elements of numbers to be 
the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a scale 
and a number."11  
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The context is a review of the views of Aristotle's predecessors 
concerning the principles or sources of all things.12 Who does Aristotle 
have in mind here, and does he understand them correctly? Some 
earlier theorists had an intense interest in mathematical research, and 
investigated correspondences between numbers and other entities, but 
there is no evidence that they built on their research in order to reach 
general ontological or cosmological conclusions.13 It was Philolaus who 
was the first to employ mathematics to further the sorts of 
investigations into the constitution of the cosmos that were first 
pursued by the Milesians.14 So, Aristotle is generally thought to have 
here had Philolaus in mind, and to have interpreted him as positing 
number as constitutive of things. Huffman has recently argued that 
this is not supported by the primary evidence, fragment 4: "And 
indeed all things that are known have number. For it is not possible 
that anything whatsoever be understood or known without this." 
Huffman argues that this direct evidence supports attributing to 
Philolaus only the more modest claim that things are known by means 
of number.15 But Aristotle interprets them as presenting a 
mathematical ontology,16 and then proceeds to argue against the 
Metaphysicsphysical cogency of that reconstruction.  
Aristotle relates that Pythagorean speculation concerning the 
mathematical basis of reality has its origin in how mathematical 
objects and attributes manifest themselves outside the realm of the 
mathematical as such, as resemblances to mathematical entities. What 
are these resemblances? Elsewhere Aristotle tells us that Eurytus 
determined the number of a horse by seeing how many pebbles need 
to be assembled in order to describe its shape;17 perhaps the 
Pythagoreans also had in mind how the sums, differences, and the like 
of numbers considered as such (that is, not as the numbers of things) 
are reflected in the sums, differences, and so forth of common objects 
like apples. The mathematical characteristics that are basic are seen in 
the phenomenal characteristics of what they cause. However, the one 
example that Aristotle here presents, how certain ratios (logoi) are 
manifest in the musical scale18 does not easily conform to this model. 
At Metaphysics 14.3.1090a23-25 Aristotle says that in this and similar 
cases the attributes (pathē) of number are present in the derivative 
things. The notes of the scale, however, or the character of harmonies 
do not resemble the underlying mathematical characteristics in any 
overt way; there is nothing in the phenomenological characteristics of 
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hearing an octave that suggests the ratio of a double. Perhaps 
Aristotle is assuming that any intelligible form of causality involves the 
transmission or manifestation of the cause in the effect, even in cases 
in which the nature of this connection is not immediately apparent.19 
Alternatively, or in addition, Aristotle may have in mind the mode of 
causal explanation employed by other Pythagoreans, that of the Table 
of Opposites, according to which items in one column are thought to 
carry with them other items in the same column.20 Perhaps items in 
the same column are thereby thought to resemble each other. I 
suspect that the term "resemblance" is not Aristotle's own, and that he 
is at a loss to clearly describe the mode of causality to which the 
Pythagoreans are appealing. For Aristotle speculates that the 
Pythagoreans took numerical relationships and attributes to be 
material causes of nonnumerical relations and attributes.21  
Aristotle does not say that these Pythagoreans identified 
numbers as the elements of things; rather, he says that, on this 
account, it is the elements of numbers that are the elements of things, 
including the totality of things, which Aristotle refers to as the whole 
heaven. We may speculate that according to Aristotle's reconstruction, 
these elements would serve as the ultimate material cause of all 
things, and numbers would serve as a higher level of matter. The 
elements of number are said to be the even and the odd, which are in 
turn associated with the unlimited and the limit.22 The same passage 
coordinates them with the limit and the unlimited, which are at the 
very least somehow associated with the principles of limiters and 
unlimiteds posited by Philolaus, but Aristotle does not spend a great 
deal of time worrying about the ontological status of an independently 
existing odd or even. For from an Aristotelian perspective, the notion 
of something being even that is not a specific even number is no more 
perplexing than the notion of a number that is not the number of a 
collection of nonquantitative units.  
Aristotle's fundamental objection to the Pythagorean account 
concerns the order of ontological dependence, as laid out in the 
Categories. Positing numbers as a substrate reverses the relation of 
dependence between number and that which is numbered. Aristotle 
directs his objection to attempts, like that of Plato's Timaeus, to 
construct bodies out of geometrical simples. “And, in general, 
conclusions contrary alike to the truth and to the usual views follow, if 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Review of Metaphysics, Vol 69, No. 4 (June 2016): pg. 687-707. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation 
Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy 
Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
7 
 
one supposes the objects of mathematics to exist thus as separate 
entities. For if they exist thus they must be prior to sensible spatial 
magnitudes, but in truth they must be posterior; for the incomplete 
spatial magnitude is in the order of generation prior, but in the order 
of substance posterior, as the lifeless is to the living.”23 Aristotle 
asserts that his argument also bears on attempts, such as that 
imputed to the Pythagoreans, to generate bodies out of numbers.24 
But are not quantitative terms present in the definitions of substances 
(as when an animal is defined as two-footed)? Aristotle would agree 
with Philolaus's assertion in fragment 4, that numbers are principles of 
our knowledge of things, but would insist that one need not be misled 
by the presence of quantitative terms in the logos by which a 
substance is defined, for priority in logos is not equivalent to 
ontological priority.  
“For the things that are prior in regard to substance are 
those that, taken by themselves, exceed in regard to being (τῇ 
μὲν γὰρ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα ὅσα χωριζόμενα τῷ εἶναι ὑπερβάλλει), but 
those that are prior in regard to logos are those that are prior to 
those whose logoi come from their logoi, and these are not 
coextensive. For if there are not attributes, such as a "moving" 
or "pale," apart from substance, then pale is prior to pale man 
in respect to logos, but not in respect to substance.24  
As in the Categories, the ontological primacy of substance over 
nonsubstances is asserted but not argued for; an example is meant to 
suffice. A quantity, such as a number, is an attribute and as such can 
be independent of the numbered no more than a quality, like pale, can 
be independent of that which is qualified. What is not a substance 
requires a substance in which to inhere, while a substance does not 
require that which is not substantial.25 Aristotle's account is 
problematic: though one might grant that there cannot be a "red" 
which is not the red of an object, one can similarly say of many 
substances that they cannot exist without being of some color or 
another (red, blue, or another).26 The fundamental difference between 
substances and nonsubstances lies in what Aristotle in the CategoHes 
identifies as a unique feature of a primary substance: as a substrate, it 
remains the same as it undergoes change.27 The same apple can turn 
from green to red, but the same red cannot turn from an apple to a 
pear. In regard to quantitative features, among which numbers are 
found, the same substance can change in respect to quantity, but the 
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same quantity cannot change in respect to the substrate of which it is 
a quantity. This is what it means to "exceed in being."28  
The Pythagoreans are positing numbers, or the elements of 
numbers, as the fundamental beings or elements out of which all 
things are constituted. Numbers, or their elements, play the role in 
Pythagorean Metaphysics that substances play in Aristotelian 
Metaphysics: they are the ultimate substrate of things. The Aristotelian 
response here is a bald assertion that this cannot be so. The 
Pythagoreans need not be without rejoinder. Aristotle himself grants 
that there can be substantial change while a nonsubstantial feature 
remains the same. One stuff can become another (as wine becomes 
vinegar) while the place (the inside of a bottle) remains constant."29 
Aristotle has the theoretical resources for dealing with this, insofar as 
he posits a material substrate that underlies both wine and vinegar.30 
But, as he is well aware from his study of the Timaeus, one could also 
posit space or place as that which stays the same while the 
characteristics that occupy place change, and that place might well be 
understood quantitatively. Positing a quantity as that which remains 
the same through a process of change is not nonsense on the face of 
it.  
Elsewhere Aristotle presents a more fundamental objection 
against a Pythagorean mathematical-physical ontology. Physical 
objects are those with a nature (phusis) which is a kind of principle of 
motion and change.31 The principles posited by the Pythagoreans in 
question apply to all beings, both those that are capable of motion and 
those that are not. For this reason, the principles that the 
Pythagoreans posit as responsible for physical reality are more 
appropriate (ἁρμοττούσας) for accounts that are “higher” (that is, 
more general) than those concerning nature.32 Motion in general can 
be neither derived from nor explained by the principles they posit, 
namely, limit and unlimited, even and odd, and number.33 A fortiori 
such accounts say nothing about the most basic natural motions 
(upward and downward) proper to light and heavy bodies.34 "Insofar 
as they make natural bodies, which have lightness and weight, out of 
numbers, which are without lightness and weight, they seem to speak 
of another heaven and other bodies, not of those that are sensible."35  
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Aristotle is here asking about the source of the nonmathematical 
characteristics of bodies.36 His example is weight (and its counterpart, 
lightness). Weight is for us a quantity, identified with a measurement 
read off of a scale, whether real or hypothetical. But for Aristotle, 
weight is a potentiality to move downward;37 although the motion can 
be described quantitatively, the motion is not itself a quantity. How is 
it, Aristotle wonders, that quantities alone can generate regular natural 
motions?38 In an implicit appeal to the Parmenidean principle that 
nothing comes from nothing,39 Aristotle argues that weight can only 
come from what has weight, and numbers are not the sort of thing 
that has weight. On the face of it, this is an odd argument for Aristotle 
to make. For why is it any less conceivable for quantities to have 
weight than it is for a substance, like a living thing, to have a color? 
On Aristotle's account, living things are essentially bodies, bodies by 
their essence have surfaces, and surfaces are (usually) colored. 
Likewise, the Pythagoreans can be understood as saying that numbers 
are simply the sorts of things as to have weight (sometimes?). 
Aristotle would likely respond to this objection by appealing to his 
distinction between potentiality and actuality. Even though color may 
well not be part of their essence, living things have this color or that 
because their essence entails the possession of certain potentialities, 
which either include or entail the potentiality to have a color. In 
contrast, the essences of numbers are wholly mathematical. They have 
no potentialities, outside of the "powers" by which they stand in 
certain properly arithmetical relations to other numbers. This is why 
nonmathematical features cannot be inferred from mathematical 
definitions.40 Considered in themselves, they neither include nor entail 
the potentiality to have nonnumerical features. To meet Aristotle's 
objection, the Pythagoreans would have to show how numbers include 
more than the mathematical features that are posited by the 
arithmeticians who study them; they also include certain 
nonmathematical potentialities. Such numbers would not be numbers 
as studied by mathematics. So on Aristotle's account, quantities 
require a nonquantitative substrate, and if one truly grasps the 
essence of the substrate, one would understand why it has the 
essential quantitative features that it has (for example, by grasping 
the essence of a horse, one would understand why it has the shape 
that it has, and why its size lies within a certain range). But note that 
the two accounts are structurally parallel.  
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On the Pythagorean account, nonquantities require a 
quantitative substrate, and if one truly grasps the essence of the 
substrate, one would understand why the substrate has the 
nonquantitative features that it has. For example, a study of the ratios 
holding among numbers would explain why musical concords sound as 
they do.  
We have seen that Aristotle faults the Pythagoreans on the 
grounds that they try to explain all things on the basis of mathematical 
objects. Not all facts of the world can be made intelligible on the basis 
of mathematical principles; only mathematical truths can. 
Nonmathematical truths can be explained only on the basis of 
nonmathematical principles. In nearly all cases, these principles will be 
the essences of the substances in which mathematical entities inhere. 
It turns out that in some cases (especially in biology), explanation will 
be grounded not in the essence of the substance, but in the essence of 
the material kind in which the substance inheres. In either such case, 
the Pythagoreans are to be faulted with grounding explanations in 
formal characteristics (such as mathematical features) alone, to the 
exclusion of the kinds that are their subjects. Both must be known. 
Both exist, and certain formal characteristics, such as the 
mathematical ones, must be recognized as inherent in more basic 
principles.  
III  
Some of Aristotle's criticisms of the Pythagoreans are less 
persuasive to us now than they would have been to his 
contemporaries. Aristotle presumes that there is no way to derive 
most of the natural characteristics of things (qualities such as color 
and temperature, as well as the natural motions proper to certain 
kinds) from mathematical characteristics alone. Modem science casts 
doubt on this. That is not to say that there are not still major 
difficulties in accounting for the phenomenological aspects of color, 
sound, and the like. This remains a major mystery to which those who 
adopt computational models of cognition (which includes most 
structural realists) have little to say. But today's Aristotelians would 
echo Aristotle's main criticism of Pythagorean number ontology: formal 
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structures and quantities inhere in more basic subjects.41 In order to 
know things, one must know both the structures and the subjects.  
Both of these points are denied by “ontic” structural realism, 
which has been defined as "a realism towards physical structures in 
the sense of networks of concrete physical relations, without these 
relations being dependent on fundamental physical objects that 
possess an intrinsic identity as their relata."42 This view has a number 
of philosophical motivations, of which the main one is epistemological. 
Structural realism is seen as a way of bypassing the traditional debate 
in the philosophy of science between realism and antirealism. Realists 
have insisted that scientific theories are offered as describing the world 
as it really is. The realist account of the semantics of scientific 
propositions is supported by the answer one usually receives when one 
asks scientists themselves what they are saying: that their accounts 
are in fact offering at least a provisional account of how things are in 
the world. To this antirealists point out that scientific theories are in a 
constant state of revision, and that there is no way to be sure that 
some future theory might come to supplant a current one. So, the 
argument goes, even the best of our scientific theories are likely 
someday to be condemned as false. It would follow that scientific 
theories, on the realist understanding, are attempts to do what might 
well be undoable. But any philosophy of science that would cast 
scientific theories to the flames has something amiss. So antirealists 
deny that successful scientific theories are to be understood as 
explaining the real constitution of things. Their success lies elsewhere. 
Different kinds of antirealists have different views as to what this 
something else is. For example, instrumentalists take scientific 
propositions to be parts of theories, which themselves are to be 
regarded as instruments enabling one to make predictions concerning 
what will be observed under certain situations, an ability of vital 
importance for technology.  
Structural realism is presented as a way to solve the problem. 
On that account, a scientific theory is not telling us about things, that 
is, the subjects of certain formal characteristics. Rather, it is telling us 
about formal characteristics alone:  “What differentiates the resulting 
form of structural realism from standard scientific realism is that the 
latter regards the mind-independent modal relations between 
phenomena as supervenient on the properties of unobservable objects 
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and the external relations between them, rather than this structure 
being ontologically basic.”43 The structural characteristics of formerly 
accepted theories are isomorphic to, or mappable onto, the structure 
of the theories that have superseded them. The new theories are 
better not because they indicate what is real whereas the old theories 
did not, but because have the advantage of saying more about the 
very structure that was recognized all along.44 Structural realists say 
that in identifying basic structures science does describe the world as 
it is, but makes no claims about the nature of anything that underlies 
those structures.45  
Structural realism has some support in innovations in computer 
science. Understanding the human mind as arising from computations 
grounded in the brain allows for an answer to a major problem with 
realism: how exactly is it that the mind is thought to be able to 
apprehend an extramental reality? The classic Aristotelian answer is 
that the human being is so constituted as to enable the knowable 
aspect of a thing to be present in the knowing subject. Thus, the 
sensible form red, by virtue of which I know that an object (such as an 
apple) is red, becomes somehow present in the sense organ, which is 
part of the whole ensouled perceptive animal.46 When one knows the 
essence of a substance such as an apple tree, one in a sense becomes 
identical with the form of the apple tree, a process that, according to 
Aristotle, requires an immaterial soul.47 The structural realist can make 
a similar move without compromising the materialist presuppositions 
of much of cognitive science. The structures in the world are 
information; a computational system, such as the human mind, can 
access that very information at various "levels of abstraction" and 
internally represent and manipulate it in certain ways that allow for 
various interactions with the world.48  
A third advantage of structural realism is the virtue of economy. 
Structural realism allows for a minimum of ontological commitments. 
We recall that the Milesians, as Aristotle interpreted them, took there 
to be at bottom one kind of thing, the nature of which would explain 
the multiplicity of phenomena. Aristotle argues that this scheme is 
unworkable, for adequate explanations require a multiplicity of formal 
elements, which in turn requires various kinds of matter in which to be 
instantiated. So, on the Aristotelian scheme, any adequate ontology 
requires two kinds of beings. There are formal elements, and there are 
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the subjects in which those elements inhere. In a contemporary 
context, these two can be understood as the natural laws that govern 
basic things or particles, on the one hand, and those basic things or 
particles themselves, on the other. Traditional scientific realism is 
committed to both of these, even though the content of its theories 
concern only the former — as theories say nothing about strings or 
quarks beyond the mathematical accounts of their features and 
behavior. Traditional realism, then, is committed to positing the 
existence of that which is knowable only as placeholder for its formal 
characteristics. But what if all of these formal elements are united as 
being "information"?49 What if all there is is information, and physical 
reality does not require a physical substrate for that information? 
Structural realism avoids commitment to an unknowable principle. Like 
the Milesians on Aristotle's understanding, structural realists posit only 
one kind of thing in principle able to ground explanations of 
everything.  
There is a possible fourth advantage to structural realism. If 
taken in a certain direction, it has potential to answer some very big 
questions concerning the nature of causality and of time and space. In 
the guise of pancomputationalism, structural realism goes beyond the 
thesis that physical processes, as governed by scientific laws, are a 
matter of regularities in how certain arrays of information determine 
others, to a view concerning how exactly this occurs: the cosmos is a 
vast computer.50 Physical reality is constituted by information of 
multidimensional space and time, laid out, somehow, in some sort of a 
grid (which can have as few as one dimension).51 Physical laws are the 
software, according to which information at one point in space/time is 
determined as information at another point. Such a thesis not only 
gives us a unified account of what the world is made of, but also 
allows the processes that govern the world to have some element of 
intelligibility. We might not be able make sense of light being both a 
wave and a particle, or of causal action at a distance, but the notion of 
a universal Turing machine is one that is familiar and intelligible. It 
provides a model by which we can make sense of the workings of all 
physical reality.52 But the thesis that the cosmos is a computer has 
been widely rejected among structural realists.53 This is not only 
because it seems fanciful and too open to quasi-theological 
speculations concerning the origins and the purpose of the system. It 
is also because it rests on two assumptions not shared by most 
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physicists. First, this thesis requires that reality be understood as 
discrete, not continuous (for computers work through manipulation of 
determinate symbols, all of which can in principle be encoded in a 
binary way, as a sequence of 0s and 1s). There is no evidence for this, 
except extrapolation from the historical record of the history of 
science.54 Second, the thesis is deterministic. Leaving aside familiar 
philosophical objections to determinism, the thesis counters the 
standard (Copenhagen) view of the interdeterminacy of events at the 
quantum level.55 In both cases, Fredkin is confident that future 
developments in physics will confirm his hunches.  
In both varieties of structural realism there are deep parallels to 
the thought of the Pythagoreans as Aristotle describes them. Yes, the 
Pythagoreans restrict their ontology to numbers, while contemporary 
structural realists are open to structures of all kinds. But numbers, 
taken either individually or in relation to one another, are examples of 
structure. Not all structures can be expressed numerically, and for the 
Pythagoreans as for all ancient Greeks, numbers would be integers, for 
which reason continuous structures would not be accepted in 
Pythagorean ontology. But if one accepts the thesis of 
pancomputationalism, the correspondence would be more exact, as all 
Turing machines manipulate discrete data, and all discrete data can be 
encoded as a series of binary elements, 0s and 1s, which together can 
be understood as constituting numbers (in base 2).  
According to structural realism of whatever variety, things are 
known by virtue of knowing structures. In ontic structural realism, 
these structures are the objects in question-there is no substrate of 
the numbers or structures posited as an unknowable surd. (This is not 
strictly speaking the case for pancomputationalism. For on this view 
the universe is the result of a cosmic computer. Both software and 
data are informational. But what of the hardware? This is unknown and 
unknowable. Fredkin calls it "the Other." He treats it as noumenal and 
waxes theological concerning its source.56 Perhaps this hardware can 
be considered the substrate for the structures involved — but only in 
an extended sense, as the structures have their status as information 
only in the context of a whole system of other structures. Suppose 
that we have a series of 0s and 1s as instantiated in a series of 
physical switches. The switches themselves are the proper subject not 
for the information, but only for the attributes being open or closed, all 
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of which is irrelevant to the computational system considered as such. 
For Fredkin, the information that is constitutive of physical reality is 
encoded in something, but that something is not itself part of or an 
aspect of the physical reality that is known. So although there is some 
sort of unknowable substrate, it would not be a substrate in the 
Aristotelian sense. It is not the case that the substrate has special 
potentialities for the kind of information instantiated in it — rather, like 
Aristotle's passive intellect, it can serve as a substrate for any 
information whatsoever. As such it is of a different ontological order 
than the information within it. The reality that the hypothesis is meant 
to account for is the reality of the structural information that is 
computed, not the system that is itself responsible for the 
computations.)  
We see that structural realism, like Aristotelian realism, 
recognizes the need to posit an ontological grounding for the adequacy 
of scientific theories. But it does so without assuming that there is a 
certain ontological substrate for the formal structures by which we 
know things. Here it is in agreement with Pythagorean ontology and 
epistemology as described by Aristotle. Aristotle rejects such a scheme 
as unintelligible. He asserts without argument that numbers and other 
quantities must be quantities of some more basic thing. In the final 
part of this paper I suggest that, in his most probing speculations 
concerning substance, he himself resorts to Pythagorean ways of 
understanding the ontology of form.  
IV  
In Metaphysics 7.3 Aristotle pursues the ultimate implications of 
his view that the foundational realities or elements of things, which he 
calls ousiai (substances), are the ultimate subjects. What can we say 
about such substrates, considered in themselves? Aristotle conducts a 
mental experiment by which he examines such a substrate, from 
which we have mentally subtracted all actual features as well as the 
potentialities for them. He is left with a something that is nothing, a 
substrate that has no characteristics at all,57 an Aristotelian analogue 
to the "bare particular" of the early analytic tradition.58 Such a thing is 
inconceivable, hence impossible. Exactly what conclusion Aristotle 
draws from this is unclear. To a large extent this issue determines the 
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path one will take in interpreting Aristotle's larger account of 
substance in the central books of the Metaphysics. Perhaps Aristotle 
drops ultimate subjecthood as a criterion for substantiality. Perhaps 
Aristotle maintains that criterion, and comes to affirm that it is not 
indeterminate matter but form or the form/matter composite that 
serves as ultimate subject, and hence substance.  
One moral of the mental experiment is clear: one ought not to 
follow the Milesians in trying to explain by identifying basic substrates, 
without an account of the formal characteristics of those substrates 
that make them what they are. It is on Aristotle's own account 
inconceivable, and hence impossible, for there to be a featureless 
substrate, and features are formal characteristics distinct, at least in 
logos, from the subjects in which they inhere.  
The subjects Aristotle posits are not featureless. They have 
essences. Substances are subjects with essences that make them the 
kind of substance they are. Substances come to be insofar as their 
form (or essence) is actualized in a more basic subject, which is 
matter. This matter itself has certain features, which are responsible 
for the potentialities to take on certain substantial forms. Thus iron 
has to have the feature of rigidity for it to serve as the subject of a 
saw,"" and the human tissues must have the features that they have, 
if they are to be the subject of a human form. These features are 
themselves formal; they are determinations of an indeterminate 
qualitative expanse. Thus the matter of a saw cannot be too soft, but, 
at least for certain varieties of sawing, it cannot be too hard either. 
Flesh cannot be too hard or too soft. For Aristotle, these determinate 
states of rigidity or heat are not quantitative. But they are not 
substantial either.  
We recall that Aristotle's core criticism against the Pythagoreans 
was that they were positing a nonsubstance as a subject. Aristotle 
does the same in regard to matter. Matter, considered simply as a 
substrate, is unintelligible. The formal features of the kind of matter 
are what give it ontological standing and some degree of intelligibility. 
Likewise, substances serve as ontological subjects, and are basic in 
scientific explanation of other aspects of reality, only insofar as they 
have certain definitional features, which are also formal.  
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We have seen that structural realists are compelled to accept 
one of two options. Either a subject of information is posited (as a kind 
of hardware and basis for digital memory) — about which nothing can 
be known and which stands outside of the reality in which one lives — 
or one dispenses altogether with an ontological subject for 
information. These positions are similar to those between which 
Aristotle must choose: positing as ultimate subject an indeterminate 
unknowable subject, and positing as ultimate subject what is 
constituted by one or more formal characteristics. While certain 
structural realists entertain the possibility that it is structure "all the 
way down," Aristotle, like the Pythagoreans he so readily dismisses, 
and like paneomputationalists, would insist on a bottom level of form, 
structure, or information in which all else inheres.60  
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